Young people, by and large, want to immigrate and live in the EU or the US and youth immigration rates are quite high. While a vocal part of the educated youth are protesting for change, would many would prefer to just give up and leave?
Below is a data-based snapshot of what Georgian youth actually do, want, and can do about emigration—plus why the picture is more nuanced than “everyone gives up and leaves.”
How many young Georgians are leaving?
| Year | Total emigrants | Share aged 15-39 | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 245 k | ≈50 % | Highest annual outflow on record |
| 2020 | 74 k | n/a | Covid-border closures pushed the figure down, showing flows can swing quickly |
Take-away: Roughly one in fourteen residents left in 2023; half were in their prime study-or-work years.
How many want to leave?
- 73 % of 18-34-year-olds “strongly or somewhat” support the idea of working or studying abroad for up to ten years.
- In a 2023 CRRC poll 20 % of all adults (and a larger share of the under-30 cohort) said it was “likely” they would go abroad for work in the next 12 months.
Desire clearly outstrips actual departures, but expressed intent is still high by regional standards.
Why go? (Top reasons young people give)
| Reason | Share selecting |
|---|---|
| Higher salaries abroad | 57 % |
| Better education | 45 % |
| More stable employment | 13 % |
| Broader “life experience” & travel | ~10 % |
Source: 2023 FES Youth Study survey of 14-29-year-olds
Economic push factors are reinforced by labour-market stats: youth salaries run 35 % below the all-age average and part-time opportunities are rare, so many study–work combinations that exist in the EU simply don’t at home.
Why don’t more leave?
| Brake | What the evidence shows |
|---|---|
| Family & care obligations | Focus-group work for the Youth Study found many under-25s feel responsible for elderly parents or younger siblings, especially outside Tbilisi. |
| Cost & visas | Even with EU visa-free 90-day travel, a work or student residence permit means several hundred € in fees plus proof-of-funds. Poorer families simply cannot front the costs. |
| Skills & language gaps | Employers in Poland, Germany and the Gulf prefer Level A2-B1 language certificates and specific trades. Only about a quarter of Georgian secondary-school leavers meet that bar. |
| Uncertainty abroad | Stories of exploitation in seasonal agriculture or caregiving jobs circulate widely on Georgian social media, making some think twice. |
Is youth emigration unique to Georgia?
No. Other small, lower-middle-income states with EU proximity show similar patterns:
| Country | Youth who “intend to emigrate” (latest survey) |
|---|---|
| Moldova | 69 % (2023 IOM poll) |
| Armenia | 61 % (2024 CRRC-Armenia) |
| Serbia | 56 % (2023 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) |
Georgia is at the upper end but not an outlier.
Impact at home
- Labor market: Youth participation dropped 3 pp between 2020-23; analysts attribute most of that fall to emigration.
- Remittances: Transfers equal 13.8 % of GDP, cushioning many families but locking others into dependence.
- Politics: High outward orientation co-exists with street protest. Surveys show the same under-30s who may leave also drive turnout at rallies for EU integration—evidence of dual strategies rather than sheer fatalism.
Will the drain continue?
| Factor | Direction |
|---|---|
| EU candidate status (Dec 2023) | Could reduce exits if accession process looks credible and creates local opportunity. |
| Digital-nomad & tech wages | Mixed: remote jobs let young Georgians earn EU-level pay without moving, but also ease later relocation. |
| Demographic squeeze | Georgia’s under-25 cohort is shrinking; absolute emigration numbers may fall even if rates stay high. |
| Skills programs | TVET reforms and bilateral training visas (e.g., Germany’s 2020 seasonal-work deal) may convert “brain drain” into “brain circulation” if return pathways are attractive. |
Emigration pressure is real and high
Roughly three-quarters of young Georgians say they would like time abroad and about half of all actual emigrants are under forty. But the narrative that “most would rather give up than fight for change” oversimplifies:
- Those protesting on Rustaveli Avenue one week and browsing Polish job boards the next are not contradictory; they are hedging bets in an uncertain polity.
- Family ties, entry-cost barriers, and nascent tech-sector opportunities create stronger anchors than outsiders often assume.
- Where credible domestic reforms (EU track, skills programs) materialise, intention-to-emigrate indicators historically fall—suggesting that the choice between leaving and believing is less fixed than it seems today.
